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STANDING TO CHALLENGE TAX-EXEMPT STATUS: THE
SECOND CIRCUIT'S COMPETITIVE POLITICAL
ADVOCATE THEORY
INTRODUCTION
In two recent cases, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ar-
ticulated a new article III standing theory, I which has been termed com-
petitive advocate standing.2 Under this theory, plaintiffs may satisfy the
Constitution's case or controversy requirement by alleging that discrimi-
natory enforcement of a statute grants an unfair advantage to a political
competitor which thereby diminishes the plaintiffs' ability to compete ef-
fectively in the political arena.3 In Fulani v. League of Women Voters
Education Fund4 and In re United States Catholic Conference,5 plaintiffs
brought suits challenging the tax-exempt status of political competitors.
In both cases, defendants challenged plaintiffs' standing. Despite similar
factual situations in the two cases, the Second Circuit reached different
conclusions on the question of plaintiffs' standing.
Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to hear only
"cases" or "controversies." 6 The case or controversy requirement en-
compasses several determinations,7 including whether the parties are
1. See In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, No. 89-1242 (April 30, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, US file); Fulani v. League
of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989).
2. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028.
3. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028-29; Fulani, 882 F.2d at 625-26. Plain-
tiffs who have asserted standing as competitive advocates have participated in the polit-
ical process, for example, by running for office, by being political activists and
participating in political debate, and by supporting candidates for public office. See Cath-
olic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1021; Fulani, 882 F.2d at 623. Competitive advocates may
allege harm to one of several constitutional interests, all of which pertain to political
participation, including: a first amendment right of political speech, a fifth amendment
right to equal protection of the laws, or an unenumerated constitutional right to vote and
participate in the political process. See Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund,
684 F. Supp. 1185, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989); Abortion
Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd sub
nom. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
No. 89-1242 (April 30, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, US file).
4. 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989).
5. 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, No. 89-1242 (April 30, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed Library, US file).
6. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This limitation ensures that the federal courts
do not issue advisory opinions that would violate the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
94-97 (1968); infra note 8 and accompanying text.
7. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 95. Additionally, prudential considerations prevent courts
from hearing political questions. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974); Flast, 392 U.S. at 95; see, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist J., concurring) (congressional challenge to executive
termination of treaty presents nonjusticiable political question); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 209 (1962) (challenge to state legislative apportionment "presents no nonjusticiable
'political question' ").
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seeking an advisory opinion,' whether the question is moot,9 and
whether the plaintiffs have standing to maintain the action.1 The deter-
mination of whether standing exists is the most difficult component of
the case or controversy analysis. 1
In order to show standing, a "plaintiff must allege personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely
to be redressed by the requested relief."1" As a result, the Supreme Court
has traditionally required the plaintiff to assert an "injury in fact,"1 3
which is "distinct and palpable"1 4 and not "abstract" or "hypotheti-
cal."" 5 A distinct injury affects the plaintiff in a manner different from
8. See Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 367 (1980); Flast, 392 U.S. at 95; Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1911); see also P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin,
D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 66-67 (3d ed.
1988) (quoting letter from Chief Justice Jay to President Washington (Aug. 8, 1793)
"[Tlhe lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of
the government .... [prevent] our extrajudicially deciding the [advisory] questions al-
luded to . .. ").
9. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
316 (1974); Flast, 392 U.S. at 95.
10. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984); Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 215;
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). The fundamental purpose of the standing require-
ment is to ensure that the party seeking relief has alleged sufficient" 'personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy'" to guarantee that issues are presented to federal courts in
an adversary manner. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 204). For a
general discussion of the Article III standing requirements, see infra notes 12-24 and
accompanying text.
11. "Standing has been called one of 'the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire
domain of public law.'" Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (quoting Professor Paul A. Freund); see
also Nichol, Injury and the Disintegration of Article Ii, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 1915 (1986)
("after almost two hundred years, the judiciary has yet to outline successfully the param-
eters of a constitutional 'case' [or controversy]"); Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization
of Public Law, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1432, 1433-34 (1988) (Supreme Court's current stand-
ing approach results in decisions denying standing when it should be granted, and grant-
ing standing when it should be denied).
12. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (plaintiff must show
actual or threatened injury fairly traceable to challenged action and redressable by
favorable decision); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)
(injury must be redressable by a favorable decision).
13. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970);
see, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978) (interference
with plaintiff's opportunity to compete for class placement because of race is injury);
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 690 (1973) (harm to use and enjoyment of natural resources is injury in fact);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962) (impairment of plaintiff's right to vote is
legally cognizable injury); see also Nichol, supra note 11, at 1924 (injury in fact is
"layperson's injury" rather than injury in law).
14. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); see, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
756 (1984) (injury to children's ability to achieve an education in racially integrated
school is concrete and personal); SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 (injury based upon aesthetic
and environmental interest is a perceptible and distinguishable harm).
15. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983); see also O'Shea v. Lit-
tleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (abstract injury insufficient to confer standing).
COMPETITIVE ADVOCATE STANDING
the population at large. 16 A palpable injury requires a "litigant's harm to
be tangible or concrete."' 7
The Supreme Court has recognized several theories in an effort to de-
fine the standing requirement."8 Each of these theories provides a frame-
work for the relatively rare instances in which a plaintiff advances an
abstract constitutional claim.1 9 For example, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized taxpayer standing,20 under which plaintiffs may challenge the
constitutionality of congressional expenditures made under the taxing
and spending authority.2" The Court has also recognized voter stand-
ing,"2 which allows plaintiffs to allege a violation of their right to vote
under the fourteenth amendment. In addition, the Court has recognized
that associations may have standing to sue either in their individual23 or
representative capacity.24
This Note evaluates the efficacy of competitive advocate standing.
Part I reviews the Second Circuit's articulation of the competitive advo-
cacy standing theory. Part II discusses the genesis of the theory and
16. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979);
Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; Nichol, supra note 11, at 1923.
17. Nichol, supra note 11, at 1923; see Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
18. See infra notes 20-24.
19. For the purposes of determining standing, courts must accept as true all of the
material allegations of a plaintiff's complaint and must construe the complaint in favor of
the complaining party. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). A credible allega-
tion of injury is sufficient to satisfy the first standing requirement because the inquiry
focuses solely on a federal court's jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claim, not on the
claim's merits. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
Thus, even though a court determines that a plaintiff has standing she may still lose her
case on the merits. See Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621,
630 (2d Cir. 1989).
20. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) (taxpayer standing to challenge
congressional expenditures violative of first amendment establishment clause).
In order to establish taxpayer standing, plaintiffs must satisfy a two-pronged test. See
id. First, the challenged expenditure must be pursuant solely to Congress' power under
the taxing and spending clause, and not an expenditure of funds in an essentially regula-
tory statute. See id. Second, a taxpayer must establish a nexus between her taxpayer
status and the precise nature of the alleged constitutional infringement. See id. Under
the second prong, a taxpayer must allege that the "challenged enactment exceeds specific
constitutional limitations" imposed upon Congress, such as limitations imposed by the
first amendment. Id. at 102-03.
21. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.
22. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962) ("injury which appellants
assert is that this classification disfavors the voters in the counties in which they reside,
placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis voters in
irrationally favored counties").
23. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982) (organi-
zations entitled to sue on own behalf for injuries sustained); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 511 (1975) ("There is no question that an association may have standing in its own
right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and
immunities the association itself may enjoy.").
24. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 511 ("Even in the absence of injury to itself, an
association may have standing solely as the representative of its members."); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) ("It is clear that an organization whose members are
injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review.").
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argues that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied a new
label to an existing theory of standing and buttressed the theory with
additional case law. Part III suggests that the Second Circuit's applica-
tion of competitive advocate standing has been inconsistent and should
be reconciled.
I. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPETITIVE ADVOCATE STANDING
A plaintiff who claims competitive advocate standing alleges that the
government enforces a statute in a discriminatory manner which confers
an unfair advantage upon a political adversary.2" As a result, the plain-
tiff's ability to compete effectively in the political arena is diminished.26
The competitive advocate, therefore, asserts the same type of injury-
alleged harm to a statutorily or constitutionally protected interest-as a
plaintiff in the traditional standing model.27 Competitive advocate stand-
ing differs from the traditional model, however, because the alleged in-
jury results from the granting of an advantage to a competitor, and not
from the direct withholding of a benefit due the plaintiff.
In Fulani v. League of Women Voters Education Fund2" and In re
United States Catholic Conference,29 the plaintiffs alleged that tax-exempt
organizations with whom they competed engaged in political activity in
violation of Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3).10 In both cases,
25. See In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, No. 89-1242 (April 30, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, US file); Fu-
lani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1989).
26. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1029; Fulani, 882 F.2d at 626. A general
claim that the government enforce the law is insufficient to confer standing because the
resulting injury is not distinct. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984); supra notes
14-17 and accompanying text. A competitive advocate, on the other hand, avoids this
problem by alleging that the discriminatory enforcement of a statute distinctly and palpa-
bly diminishes her political speech. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028-29; Fulani,
882 F.2d at 625.
27. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (standing to challenge religious
organization's involvement in federal grant program which provided funds for adolescent
counseling); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-75 (1982) (standing to
members of non-profit organization to challenge racial steering practices of landlords);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (taxpayer standing to challenge congressional
funding of religious schools); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964) (standing to
challenge congressional apportionment statute); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206-08
(1962) (standing to challenge state legislative apportionment statute).
28. 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989).
29. 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, No. 89-1242 (April 30, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed Library, US file).
30. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1022; Fulani, 882 F.2d at 624-25. Both
cases involved a challenge to the tax-exempt status of organizations under Internal Reve-
nue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), which confers tax-exempt status upon organizations
that meet its requirements. Section 501(c)(3) provides tax exempt status to:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes .... no substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation
(except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate
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the plaintiffs sued the federal government charging that discriminatory
enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code diminished their ability to
compete in the political arena by granting an economic advantage to a
political competitor.3 1
Fulani involved a challenge to the section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status
of the League of Women Voters by a third-party presidential candidate.32
The plaintiff alleged that the federal government's failure to enforce the
Internal Revenue Code against the League distorted the political process
by allowing the League to subsidize, through the section 501(c)(3) ex-
emption, the campaigns of other candidates to the disadvantage of her
campaign. 3
The Second Circuit found the harm asserted by the plaintiff-a dimin-
ished voice in the presidential election-sufficient to satisfy the injury in
fact requirement for standing.3a In particular, the court noted that the
plaintiff's exclusion from the televised presidential primary debates im-
paired her ability to compete equally with other significant presidential
candidates. 35 Taking a broad view of the injury asserted, the court held
that the plaintiff need not prove that exclusion from the primary debates
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office.
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988) (emphasis added). Donations to an organization meeting
the section 501(c)(3) requirements are tax deductible. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)
(1988) (listing permissible tax-deductible donations). As conditions of tax-exempt and
tax-deductible status, a section 501(c)(3) organization is prohibited from devoting more
than an insubstantial part of its activities in an attempt to influence legislation, including
contacting or urging the public to contact members of a legislative body for the purpose
of opposing or supporting legislation or participating directly or indirectly in any political
campaign. See 26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(v)(3) (1989).
31. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1022; Fulani, 882 F.2d at 625.
32. See Fulani, 882 F.2d at 623.
33. See id. at 625. As a result, the plaintiff sought to compel the federal government
to revoke the League's section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. See id. at 623. The plaintiff
also alleged that "the League had engaged in impermissible 'partisan' activity when it
denied her the right to participate in the Democratic and Republican primary debates,"
in violation of the League's tax-exempt status. Id. at 624. The plaintiffs contended that
the section 501(c)(3) prohibitions against electioneering obligated the League to use non-
partisan criteria in their candidate selection process. See id. at 625. For relief, the plain-
tiff initially sought to enjoin the League from holding any presidential primary debates
without inviting her to participate on equal terms. See id. at 623. For the purposes of
determining standing, the court discussed only the claim against the federal government,
since at the time of the appeal the debates in question had already been held. See id. at
625.
34. See id. at 626.
35. See id. The court noted that "[lt is beyond dispute that participation in these
debates bestowed on the candidates who appeared in them some competitive advantage
over their non-participating peers." Id. see also Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 165 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) ("[petitioners'] inclusion in the televised debates undoubtedly would have ben-
efited their campaign"); 2 R. Bauer & D. Kafka, United States Federal Election Law 29
(1984) (major party competitors in candidate debates receive "substantial media exposure
without charge [which] constitute[s] a benefit of considerable value" to them at expense
of non-major party candidates).
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affected the election results in order to have standing to sue.36
One month later, the Second Circuit decided In re United States Cath-
olic Conference37 without any discussion of its opinion in Fulani. The
plaintiffs in Catholic Conference, a group of section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
abortion rights organizations,3" challenged the tax-exempt status of the
Catholic Church. 39 The plaintiffs alleged that the federal government
failed to enforce the Internal Revenue Code's prohibition against lobby-
ing' by not revoking the Church's section 501(c)(3) status when the
Church endorsed or supported pro-life political candidates and opposed
pro-choice candidates.4" The plaintiffs also charged that this disparate
treatment afforded a competitive advantage to the Catholic Church
through the section 501(c)(3) tax subsidy, which concomitantly dimin-
ished the plaintiffs' effectiveness in the political arena.42
In contrast to Fulani, Catholic Conference held that the plaintiffs' al-
leged injury was insufficient to meet the article III standing require-
ments.43 The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs were not competitive
advocates because they did not compete with the Catholic Church in the
political arena,' in that "they [chose] not to match the Church's alleged
36. See Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 627 (2d Cir.
1989). In addition to holding that the plaintiff had met the injury-in-fact requirement,
the court also found that she had satisfied the article III redressability and traceability
standing requirements. See id. at 627-28; supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Although the court conceded the plaintiff's standing, she ultimately lost on the merits
when the court determined that exclusion from the presidential primary debates did not
amount to partisan activity on the part of the League. See Fulani, 882 F.2d at 629-30.
37. 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, No. 89-1242 (April 30, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed Library, US file). Catholic Conference was heard by the Supreme Court on an
issue unrelated to competitive advocate standing. See United States Catholic Conference
v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988). The issue in this prior case
was whether the Catholic Church, as a non-party witness in contempt of court for failing
to comply with discovery requests, could challenge the jurisdiction of the district court.
The Supreme Court held that they could, see id. at 76, and remanded the case to the
Second Circuit to determine jurisdiction. The Second Circuit issued the opinion which is
the subject of this Note.
38. The relevant plaintiffs for competitive advocacy purposes were Internal Revenue
Code section 501(c)(3) & (4) tax-exempt organizations that supported a woman's right to
choose an abortion. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1021.
39. See id.
40. See supra note 30.
41. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1022. The plaintiffs also contended that the
Church contributed "substantial sums of money to 'right to life' and other political
groups which have, directly or indirectly, supported the political candidacies for public
office of persons favoring anti-abortion legislation." Id.
42. See id. at 1028-29. For relief, plaintiffs sought declarations that the defendants
had violated both section 501(c)(3) and the establishment clause of the first amendment
of the Constitution. See id. at 1023; U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 1. The plaintiffs also
sought injunctive relief to compel the government to revoke the Church's tax-exempt
status, to collect the back taxes, and to notify contributors to the Catholic Church of its
change in tax status. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1023.
43. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1031.
44. See id. at 1029. The court also examined whether plaintiffs had standing under
three other theories. Clergy plaintiffs claimed that failure of the government to enforce
[Vol. 58
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electioneering with their own."'45
The dissent concluded that the plaintiffs did compete with the Church
in the abortion debate.46 The dissent argued that the plaintiffs need not
have violated the tax code in order to be competitors, and that the plain-
tiffs did not forgo electioneering as a matter of personal preference, but
rather out of obedience to a requirement of an act of Congress.47 There-
fore, the "competition [was] between those tax-exempt organizations that
[were] abiding by the limitations of section 50 1(c)(3) in their advocacy on
the abortion issue and the Catholic Church, which [was] violating these
limitations in the advocacy of its point of view."4"
II. GENESIS OF COMPETITIVE ADVOCATE STANDING
Although competitive advocate standing is a new theory in name, the
federal courts of the District of Columbia have developed an identical
theory.49 The Second Circuit replicated this theory,5 ° labeled the doc-
the Internal Revenue Code against the Catholic Church was an impermissible subsidy of
religion, and thereby denigrated their dissimilar religious views. See id. at 1024. Tax-
payer plaintiffs claimed that the government's subsidy of the Church's political activities
was the equivalent of government expenditure to establish religion and violated the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment. See id. at 1027. Voter plaintiffs claimed that the
government's refusal to revoke the Catholic Church's tax-exempt status impaired and
diminished their right to vote. See id. at 1028. The court determined that the plaintiffs
did not have standing under any of these theories. See id. at 1026 (clergy standing); id. at
1028 (taxpayer standing); id. at 1028 (voter standing).
45. Id. at 1029. The Court also denied standing on another ground: recognition of
competitive advocate standing upon these facts would make it "difficult to deny standing
to any person who simply expressed an opinion contrary to that of the Catholic Church."
Id. at 1030. But see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (standing should
not be denied simply because many people suffer same injury); Tax Analysts & Advocates
v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 898 (D.D.C. 1974) (same). The Catholic Conference dissent
was unpersuaded by the majority's reasoning on this point. As the dissent pointed out,
the majority failed to consider that the plaintiffs were not citizens at large, but rather
organizations that advocated a specific point of view, and that were constrained in their
advocacy by a federal statute. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1033 (Newman, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also noted that the court's concern on this point was unnecessary
because whether an individual citizen could challenge the Church's action is a "question
far beyond the narrow issue we are required to decide in this case." Id.
46. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1033.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n, 678 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 459 U.S. 983 (1982); Taxation with Rep-
resentation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 461 U.S. 540
(1983); Common Cause v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1980); Tax Analysts & Advo-
cates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974); Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1971). The line of cases in the District of Columbia
federal courts is not limited to discriminatory enforcement of statutes; these courts have
also found standing when plaintiffs have challenged the facial validity of statutes under a
competitor theory. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists, 678 F.2d at 1097-98
(standing to challenge amendments to federal election laws).
50. See In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028-30 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, No. 89-1242 (April 30, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, US file); Fu-
lani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 626-27 (2d Cir. 1989).
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trine competitive advocate standing, and buttressed it with a well-estab-
lished line of Supreme Court economic competitor cases."1
A. Political Competition Cases
The federal courts of the District of Columbia have developed a stand-
ing theory identical to competitive advocate standing, whereby plaintiffs
allege that a statute grants an unfair advantage to their competitors by
exclusively subsidizing their competitors' voices.52 This economic ad-
vantage, plaintiffs allege, diminishes their ability to affect the political
process. 3 The federal courts of the District of Columbia have found this
to be a sufficient injury for article III standing. 4
For example, in Common Cause v. Bolger,"5 congressional candidates
and their supporters alleged that the government discriminatorily en-
forced56 the congressional franking statute,57 thus allowing it to subsidize
effectively the campaigns of incumbent members of Congress.58 This
subsidy, plaintiffs argued, diminished their ability to compete in the polit-
51. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Arnold Tours, Inc. v.
Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970); infra notes 67-82 and accompanying text; see also Catholic Conference, 885
F.2d at 1029-30 (discussing economic competitor cases).
52. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n, 678 F.2d 1092, 1094 (D.C. Cir.) (alleging federal election laws irrationally
favor corporate political action committees (PACs) over union PACs), aff'd, 459 U.S.
983 (1982); Taxation with Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 717-18 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (alleging Internal Revenue Code illegally subsidizes lobbying activities of veterans'
organizations and not lobbying activities of competitor organizations), rev'd on other
grounds, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889,
898 (D.D.C. 1974) (alleging Internal Revenue Ruling has effect of favoring large political
contributors over small).
53. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists, 678 F.2d at 1098 (union members al-
leged "relative diminution of their political voices-their influence in federal elections-
as a direct result of the discriminatory imbalance Congress is alleged to have ordered");
Taxation with Representation, 676 F.2d at 721-22 (disparate tax treatment under Internal
Revenue Code causes plaintiffs substantial disadvantages, such as diminished fundraising
capabilities); Tax Analysts & Advocates, 376 F. Supp. at 898 (plaintiffs alleged govern-
ment tax advantage to large political contributors diminishes their ability to affect electo-
ral process).
54. See, e.g., InternationalAss'n of Machinists, 678 F.2d at 1098 (relative diminution
of political voices is sufficient injury for article III standing); Taxation with Representa-
tion, 676 F.2d at 722-23 (injury due to disparate application of tax code is sufficient for
article III standing); Tax Analysts & Advocates, 376 F. Supp. at 899 (diminished ability to
affect electoral process is sufficient for article III standing). But see Fulani v. Brady, 729
F. Supp. 158, 162-63 (D.D.C. 1990) (injury from loss of media exposure due to exclusion
from presidential debates is abstract and speculative and thus insufficient for article III
standing).
55. 512 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1980).
56. See id. at 32.
57. See 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1988). The "frank" is the stamp which allows members of
Congress to use the United States mails free of charge. See 39 U.S.C. § 3210(a)(1) (1988).
The frank, however, may not be used for political purposes. See 39 U.S.C.
§§ 3210(a)(5)(A), 3210(a)(5)(C) (1988).
58. See Common Cause, 512 F. Supp. at 28.
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ical process and thereby violated their first and fifth amendment rights.5 9
The district court found that plaintiffs had standing to sue because
they were "substantial users of the mail for political campaign pur-
poses."'  Under this theory, plaintiffs were allegedly injured by the ille-
gal mail subsidy that the government granted to their competitors. 61 The
court noted that while this type of competitor status was usually granted
in the commercial context,6' it would be "strange" to deny such standing
to substantial users of the mail for political purposes.63
The approach taken by the District of Columbia federal courts is ana-
lytically identical to that taken by the Second Circuit in both Fulani and
Catholic Conference. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged the same injury
in the District of Columbia and Second Circuit cases. Both alleged that
the federal government had discriminatorily enforced a federal statute 4
which conferred an unfair economic advantage upon a'competitor, 61 and
which in turn diminished the plaintiffs' effectiveness in the political
arena. 66 It is thus evident that the Second Circuit has not developed a
new theory of standing, but rather has attached a new label to a theory
previously relied upon by other federal courts.
B. Economic Competitor Cases
The Second Circuit relied upon a series of Supreme Court economic
competitor cases for analytical support of its competitive advocate the-
ory.67 These cases arose when banks diversified their functions and be-
gan to compete in the delivery of incidental banking services.68
59. See id. at 32.
60. Id. at 31.
61. See id.
62. See id.; see also 39 C.F.R. § 954.10 (1989) (allowing intervention in proceedings
before postal service to challenge competitor's second class mail classification).
63. See Common Cause v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 26, 31 (D.D.C. 1980).
64. See In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1022 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, No. 89-1242 (April 30, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, US file); Fulani v.
League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1989); International
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Federal Election Comm'n, 678 F.2d 1092,
1094-5 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 459 U.S. 983 (1982); Taxation with Representation v. Regan,
676 F.2d 715, 717-18 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'don other grounds, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Com-
mon Cause, 512 F. Supp. at 33; Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889,
898 (D.D.C. 1974).
65. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1021; Fulani, 882 F.2d at 625; International
Ass'n of Machinists, 678 F.2d at 1098; Taxation with Representation, 676 F.2d at 722-23;
Common Cause, 512 F. Supp. at 31; Tax Analysts & Advocates, 376 F. Supp. at 898.
66. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1029; Fulani, 882 F.2d at 625; International
Ass'n of Machinists, 678 F.2d at 1098; Taxation with Representation, 676 F.2d at 722-23;
Common Cause, 512 F. Supp. at 31; Tax Analysts & Advocates, 376 F. Supp at 898.
67. See supra note 51.
68. Section 24 of the National Bank Act lists permissible activity for national banks,
including "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking." 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988). Additionally, section 1864 of the 1964 National Bank
Act provides: "No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the
performance of bank services for banks." 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964). At issue in the eco-
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The paramount economic competitor case is Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp.6 9 The plaintiffs in Data
Processing challenged a federal ruling that allowed national banks to pro-
vide data processing services to customers and to other banks.7" The
plaintiffs alleged that this ruling contravened provisions of the National
Bank Act,7 which prohibited bank service corporations from engaging
in "any activity other than the performance of bank services for
banks."72 To meet the standing requirement, the plaintiffs alleged that
their future profits would be diminished by competition from national
banks providing data processing services. 7
The Court termed the case a "competitor's suit,"'74 and found that the
challenged action caused plaintiffs sufficient injury in fact to confer
standing.75 Thus, the Data Processing holding supports the Second Cir-
cuit's contention that competitor status can be a basis for standing. Ad-
ditionally, the Supreme Court laid the groundwork for competitive
advocate standing by indicating that an injury that is not economic in
nature, such as an aesthetic, conservational or spiritual interest, could be
sufficient to confer standing.76
The Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court precedent in Data
Processing in developing the competitive advocate theory, concluding
that "political competitors arguably should fare as well [as economic
competitors]. 77 The court also relied on other economic competitor
cases71 that provide a foundation for the competitive advocate theory.79
nomic competitor suits was whether the services in question were permissible under these
statutes. See Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970).
69. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
70. See id. at 151.
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964); see supra note 68.
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964); see Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 155; supra note 68.
73. In fact, one of the named bank defendants was preparing to perform data process-
ing services for two of the plaintiffs' customers. See Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 150, 152 (1970).
74. Id. (emphasis in original).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 153-54; see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978)
(recognizing standing under endangered species act to challenge alleged threat to conser-
vation interest); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (standing based on
environmental and aesthetic interests); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 211-12 (1972) (standing based on interest in benefits of interracial association).
77. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, No. 89-1242 (April 30, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, US file).
78. In Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970), travel agents challenged a
ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency that permitted banks to provide travel services
to their customers. See id. at 45 n.1. Plaintiffs alleged that they had lost and would
continue to lose business as a result of the ruling. See id. at 45. Extending the Data
Processing holding, the Court determined that plaintiffs had standing to sue because na-
tional banks "compete with travel agents no less than they compete with data processors
when they provide data-processing services." Id. at 46.
In Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 479 U.S. 388 (1987), the Supreme Court
held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge a Comptroller's ruling that allowed
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In these cases, the plaintiffs alleged that a government misinterpretation
of the National Bank Act allowed banks to compete with the plaintiffs in
contravention of congressional banking restrictions.8s  The Supreme
Court found that the plaintiffs had standing as economic competitors to
challenge these rulings."1
The competition that was found sufficient to confer standing in these
economic competitor cases is analytically similar to the competition that
underlies the competitive advocacy theory. It is not, however, com-
pletely analogous. In the economic competitor cases, the plaintiffs con-
tended that a government misreading of the National Bank Act allowed
a third party, who was not previously a competitor, to compete with the
plaintiffs.8 2 A competitive advocate, in contrast, lawfully competes with
an adversary and alleges that government action has unlawfully con-
ferred an advantage upon a competitor which has not been conferred
upon the plaintiff."3 Nonetheless, as the Second Circuit has indicated, 4
the Supreme Court's acceptance of competition as a basis for standing
provides strong support for the competitive advocate standing doctrine.
III. RECONCILIATION OF FULANI AND CATHOLIC CONFERENCE
Although the facts of Fulani and Catholic Conference were similar, the
Second Circuit, applying competitive advocate standing, reached differ-
ent conclusions on the question of plaintiff's standing.8 5 There is no
principled distinction between the factual circumstances of the two cases.
Therefore, it is possible to reconcile the two cases to ensure proper and
uniform application of the doctrine in the future.
In Fulani, the court found the plaintiff's diminished ability to compete
in the electoral process sufficient injury for standing.8 6 The majority in
banks to provide out-of-state discount brokerage services to the public. See id. at 390-92.
The plaintiffs alleged that the practice had caused them financial injury and violated state
bank branching law. See id. at 392-93. The Court, relying on Data Processing, held that
the plaintiffs, as "competitors..., are very reasonable candidates to seek review of the
Comptroller's rulings." Id. at 403.
79. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1029-30.
80. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
81. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987); Arnold Tours,
Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46-47 (1970).
82. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 25-48 and accompanying text.
84. See In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028-30 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, No. 89-1242 (April 30, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, US file).
85. See supra notes 28-48 and accompanying text.
86. See Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir.
1989); supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text. In reaching this conclusion, the court
noted that elections in a democratic society "serve other purposes besides electing partic-
ular candidates to office. They are also used to educate the public, to advance unpopular
ideas, and to protest the political order." Fulani, 882 F.2d at 627 (quoting Common
Cause v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 26, 32 (D.D.C. 1980)); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-
15 (1976) (the "ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for
office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the
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Catholic Conference, on the other hand, held that the plaintiffs did not
have standing as competitive advocates 87 because they did not compete
with the Catholic Church and because the tax status of the plaintiffs had
been correctly assessed. 8
In Catholic Conference, the plaintiffs claimed the same deprivation of
their rights to political speech as asserted in FulanL The only difference
between the two groups of plaintiffs was that in Catholic Conference the
plaintiffs were advocates, not candidates. This different status, however,
does not affect the plaintiffs' claimed injury: in both cases, the plaintiffs
alleged that the government diminished their ability to engage in debate
by promoting their adversaries' interests over their own.89
The dissent in Catholic Conference offered a more principled reading
of the allegations asserted and a more persuasive argument in favor of
standing. The dissent sharply disagreed with the majority's determina-
tion that the section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations did not compete
with the Catholic Church and criticized the majority for taking an
overly-narrow "view of both the realities of American political life and
the contours of the doctrine of competitive advocate standing."'
According to the dissent, competition existed between the plaintiffs,
who complied with the limitations of section 501(c)(3) in their advocacy
of the abortion issue, and the Catholic Church, whose advocacy in the
abortion debate allegedly did not abide by these limitations.91 Hence, the
plaintiffs should not have been denied competitive advocate standing
simply because they obeyed an act of Congress, as they would have com-
peted with their adversary but for the prohibitions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.92 The dissent, in addition, did not believe that one need
compete in the identical manner as an opponent in order to establish
competitive advocate standing.9 3 Political advocacy takes many forms:
some run for office, some support candidates, and others devote their
time and money to political causes.9 4 The plaintiffs in Catholic Confer-
course that we follow as a nation"). As the Fulani court noted, dilution of the plaintiff's
ability to advance unpopular ideas, and to protest the political order would clearly cause
the plaintiff distinct injury. See generally Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party, 440 U.S. 173, 186 (1979) ("[Ain election campaign is a means of disseminating
ideas as well as attaining political office. Overbroad restrictions on ballot access jeopard-
ize this form of political expression."). It is unclear, however, how dilution of the third
ancilary role--education of the public-inflicts on the plaintiff an injury which is distinct
from the citizenry at large.
87. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1030-31; supra notes 36-43 and accompany-
ing text.
88. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1030. In addition, the court noted that "[b]y
asserting that an advantage to one competitor adversely handicaps the others, plaintiffs
have not pleaded that they were personally denied equal treatment." Id.
89. See supra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
90. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1032 (Newman, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 1033.
92. See id.




ence did not compete in the political arena by supporting candidates for
public office. Instead, they chose to advocate their competing views by
distributing information, speaking, writing, marching, and "championing
in countless other ways the cause of abortion rights. 95
The dissent's argument in favor of granting the Catholic Conference
plaintiffs standing as competitive advocates9 6 is supported by the princi-
ple that a plaintiff need not violate a statute to question its constitutional-
ity.97 Rather, a threat of prosecution under a statute may by itself be
sufficient to confer standing.98 Therefore, the decision in Catholic Con-
ference that the plaintiffs need actually engage in political activity in vio-
lation of their section 501(c)(3) status to qualify as competitors is
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
For example, in Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Commission,99
a corporation's shareholders had authorized its president to donate up to
$10,000 in corporate political donations to federal election campaigns.10 0
Recognizing that this action would violate federal election laws,' ° 1 the
shareholders made these donations contingent upon repeal of the con-
gressional prohibition.102 Both the corporation and its president alleged
that the election laws violated their first amendment rights because they
were faced with the choice of having their right to speak diminished or
exercising the right with the risk of suffering statutory penalties.10 3 But
for the statute in question, the plaintiffs would have engaged in the pro-
scribed conduct. The court found that the plaintiffs "should not be re-
quired to expose themselves to prosecution to secure the desired
95. Id. The dissent also would have granted standing to the plaintiff section 501(c)(4)
organization on a similar theory. See id. at 1033. Section 501(c)(4) tax-exempt organiza-
tions are not subject to the restraints on political activity to which section 501(c)(3) orga-
nizations are, but donations that they solicit are not tax-deductible to their donors. See
26 U.S.C. §§ 170 (a), 501(c)(4) (1988). Under this variant of competitive advocate stand-
ing, both parties directly compete in the political arena through lobbying activities, but
the Catholic Church arguably does so with a stronger voice because of its greater fun-
draising capabilities under sections 170 and 501(c)(3). See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d
at 1033-34. The plaintiff is injured, therefore, because the Catholic Church can engage in
political activities and raise funds that are tax-deductible to its donors, while the plaintiff
can engage in comparable political activity only with donations that are not tax-deducti-
ble. See id.
96. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
97. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775 (1978); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 459 (1974); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973); Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 689 F.2d 1006, 1012 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1092
(1984).
98. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
99. 689 F.2d 1006 (1 1th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1092 (1984).
100. See id. at 1008.
101. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1988) (unlawful for any corporation to make contri-
butions or expenditures in connection with any political primary election, general election
or primary caucus for federal office, as well as for candidates to receive such
contributions).
102. See Athens Lumber, 689 F.2d at 1008.
103. See id. at 1011-12.
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relief,"1" as long as they have expressed an intention to engage in a
course of conduct "'arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but
proscribed by a statute.' "105
The penalties faced by the plaintiffs in Athens Lumber and similar
cases are analogous to the potential loss of tax-exempt status faced by the
section 501(c)(3) organizations in Catholic Conference. By competing
with the Catholic Church in the political arena, these organizations
would have risked the revocation of their tax-exempt status. Conse-
quently, reasoning similar to that used in these cases could have been
used to support standing in Catholic Conference.
CONCLUSION
Competitive advocate standing provides a plaintiff with a framework
for asserting a claim of political injury. 106 Under this theory, plaintiffs
can allege that the government has diminished their effectiveness in the
political arena by granting an unfair advantage to a competitor. While
the competitive advocate standing label is new, the concept is not. It has
strong antecedents in cases holding that economic and political competi-
tors may allege injury sufficient to confer standing.
104. Id. at 1012.
105. Id. (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979)). For support, Athens Lumber relied upon First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978), in which the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not have to
violate a Massachusetts criminal statute, which prevented banks from making certain
political contributions, in order to have standing to challenge the statute's constitutional-
ity. See id. at 775. While the primary justiciability issue in this case was mootness, see id.
at 774-75, the court acknowledged the anticipatory nature of the plaintiff's injury by
referring to the "threat of prosecution" which the plaintiff faced. See id. at 775.
The Supreme Court's decision in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), does not
adversely affect this conclusion. In Lyons, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did
not have standing 'to challenge the constitutionality of a police department's use of
chokeholds. See id. at 111-12. Although the plaintiff had been subjected to a chokehold
in the past, the Court determined standing did not exist because there was no "real and
immediate threat that [petitioner] would again be stopped... by an officer ... who would
illegally choke him into unconsciousness." See id. at 105. This situation is distinguish-
able from the threat of prosecution asserted by the plaintiffs in Catholic Conference, Ath-
ens Lumber and Bellotti, because the plaintiffs in all three cases would have acted in the
prohibited manner but for the proscribed penalties. The petitioner in Lyons, in contrast,
could not demonstrate that he would in the future be both apprehended by the police and
be subjected to a chokehold. See id. at 105.
106. As the government becomes increasingly involved in regulating the political pro-
cess, the likelihood that some political participants will glean advantages at the expense
of others is increased. Recent proposals to reform congressional election laws are one
example. In an effort to reduce the ever-increasing costs of congressional campaigns, a
bipartisan Senate commission recently proposed that free television time be distributed to
the Democratic and Republican parties. The parties, in turn, would distribute this televi-
sion time among their respective candidates. See Oreskes, Failures in a Political System
Spur Momentum for Change, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1990, at Al, col. 1, A22, col. 2.
While such a proposal may reduce major party candidates' fundraising burdens, it has the
necessary side-effect of subsidizing the campaigns of such candidates to the exclusion of
any third party or independent candidates.
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In the cases in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
identified and applied competitive advocate standing, the plaintiffs as-
serted identical injuries: competitive disadvantage due to government
distortion of the political process. Because there is no principled way to
distinguish these two cases, it is apparent that the Second Circuit applied
the competitive advocate theory inconsistently. Based upon the court's
articulation of the theory and the supporting case law, the stronger posi-
tion is that competitive advocate standing was properly applied by the
court in Fulani and by the dissent in Catholic Conference.
Jordana G. Schwartz
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